University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
Philosophy Publications

Department of Philosophy

2006

Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason
Christopher Tindale
University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/philosophypub
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Tindale, Christopher. (2006). Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason. Informal Logic, 26
(3), 341-357.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/philosophypub/21

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at Scholarship at
UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Publications by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason

341

Perelman, Informal Logic and
the Historicity of Reason
CHRISTOPHER W. TINDALE

University of Windsor

Abstract: In a posthumous paper, Perelman
discusses his decision to bring his theory of
argumentation together with rhetoric rather
than calling it an informal logic. This is due
in part because of the centrality he gives to
audience, and in part because of the negative
attitude that informal logicians have to
rhetoric. In this paper, I explore both of these
concerns by way of considering what benefits
Perelman’s work can have for informal logic,
and what insights the work of informal
logicians might bring to the project of
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.

Résumé: Dans un article posthume
Perelman discute de sa décision de joindre sa
théorie d’argumentation à la rhétorique
plutôt qu’à la logique non formelle. Ceci est
dû partiellement à l’importance qu’il accorde
à l’auditoire, et partiellement à l’attitude
négative des logiciens non formels à l’égard
de la rhétorique. Dans cet article j’explore
ses deux raisons en examinant les bénéfices
que son œuvre peut apporter à la logique
non formelle, et les contributions que celleci pourrait apporter au projet de Perelman
et d’Olbrecht-Tyteca.

Keywords: audience, evaluation, informal logic, historicity of reason, noninteractive
audience, Perelman, Reason, rhetoric.

1. Introduction
In a posthumous paper, Perelman makes an interesting observation: “It is on account
of the importance of audience that I bring the theory of argumentation together
with rhetoric rather than styling it an informal logic, as do the young logicians of
today who take an interest in argumentation, but for whom the word ‘rhetoric’
retains its pejorative aspect” (1989, p. 247).1 The identity of those “young logicians”
(this would have been written in the early 1980s) must remain a mystery. What
should matter to us is the choice involved along with the reasons for it. Two points
emerge: that informal logic is judged not to value the importance of audience, and
that logicians drawn to informal logic hold rhetoric in disdain. In considering
Perelman’s relationship to informal logic, I want to begin by investigating these
two ideas to determine the degree to which the charges have merit, particularly
over the span of the last twenty years of informal logic’s development.
These are two quite different questions. It might be that in the development of
informal logic an appreciation of audience has indeed emerged, while rhetoric per
se is viewed negatively due to its continued association with strategies of exploitation
© Informal Logic Vol. 26, No. 3 (2006): pp. 341-357.
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in the manner of eristical tricks that bend an audience to the will of arguer in
underhanded ways rather than through the force of good reasons. Whatever the
case, I believe that Perelman’s work shares many important themes with the projects
of informal logic, such that they both have points of value to contribute to each
other. Moreover, the value of what Perelman’s work promises lies exactly in these
two areas of concern: the positive treatment of rhetoric in argumentation, and
central role of audiences with its important associated historical sense of rationality.

2. The Reaction to Rhetoric
The degree to which the word “rhetoric” has ever had a pejorative association for
informal logicians is unclear. Perelman is less than helpful here, failing to elaborate
on the remark and provide names with which he associates the attitude. While
rhetoric and philosophy have long since lost the connections they held for Aristotle
and those who followed him, we cannot simply infer from this that rhetoric has
been viewed distrustfully simply because it has been judged irrelevant to the truthseeking goals of philosophers.
It is possible that Perelman has in mind remarks like this from Copi (1982,
p.88) who speaks of rhetoric being “of course…wholly worthless in resolving a
question of fact;” and the more damning statement in his Informal Logic: “In
political campaigns today almost every rhetorical trick is played to make the worse
seem the better cause” (Copi, 1986, p.97). But elsewhere in his standard text, Copi
speaks positively about rhetoric, and the later book that seems to associate it with
the tricks of eristics did not appear until after Perelman’s death. More alarming is
John Nolt’s then-popular informal logic text which specifically identifies rhetoric
as being “concerned with influencing people’s beliefs without regard for truth”
(1984, p.278). Again, perhaps at issue was the work of “standard” informal logicians
like Johnson and Blair, with whom Perelman was familiar.2 A rhetorician giving a
cursory read to the first edition of Logical Self-Defense (1977) may well be arrested
by a section titled “Eliminating Rhetoric” (p.107) that offered advice on extracting
the argument from the rhetoric and diluting the persuasive force of some
characterizations that are built into the language.3 These selective “glimpses” may
well capture the general appreciation of rhetoric (or lack thereof) in the late 1970’s
and early 1980’s (when Perelman would have made his judgment). But it also
seems reasonable to suggest that this attitude was grounded more in ignorance
than ill-will. That is, philosophically-trained informal logicians were likely unaware
that rhetoric could have anything other than a pejorative sense. Subsequent exposure
to the works of rhetoricians and speech communication scholars, as the interests
of many informal logicians has coincided with those of that community, has brought
a more accurate appreciation of the wider senses ‘rhetoric’ can have, including the
positive. Thus, later work by informal logicians has tended to reflect this greater
awareness and sensitivity.4 A case in point is the Johnson and Blair text, which by
the third edition (1993) asserts: “In our opinion, rhetoric as a discipline has important
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insights about argumentation which logicians need to embrace…. In our experience,
logicians tend to underestimate the importance of audience and context to the
comprehension and evaluation of argumentation” (pp.142-43). This corrective
has the added merit of also addressing the second concern in Perelman’s statement.
It is difficult, then, to see the pejorative sense of rhetoric promoted in the work
of serious informal logicians. If anything, there is a tendency toward neglect rather
than dismissal. Granted, the general suspicion of rhetoric in public media seems a
widely shared prejudice. It is seen in the everyday rejections of positions as being
largely rhetorical. More pertinently, though, it can creep into the tenor of some of
the criticisms mobilized against the New Rhetoric5 (discussed below) that identifies
in the focus on audience an extreme relativism which invites, if not encourages,
exploitation, a goal traditionally associated with the pejorative sense. But such a
license to exploit is never a view that Perelman tolerated and I will argue that no
balanced reading of the New Rhetoric can seriously find support for it there.
Perelman’s entire academic career is grounded in and characterized by an abiding
interest in justice, and that interest saturates the work on argumentation. While not
explicitly stated, it is fair to interpret the rhetorical argumentation that he develops
as a counter to all moves to exploitation of audiences and as a tool that will facilitate
the development of a more just society. Fairly presented, argumentation animates
human freedom (1969, p.514), germinating that sphere in which reasonable choice
can be exercised. And it does this because the rationality of the activity itself is
predicated upon the existence of a community of minds.
Any community requires a range of commonalities of language and of interests
that binds it. But entering into argumentation with others also confers value upon
them, recognizes them as worth persuading and attaching importance to their
agreement (1969, p.16).6 Establishing communion with an audience (in the rhetorical
sense) involves understanding their positions, viewing things from their perspective
and sharing that perspective to some degree. Moreover, this attitude elicits “some
concern for the interlocutor” and requires that the arguer “be interested in his state
of mind” (p.16).
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca illustrate the nature of this concern with remarks
that bear on the use of the ad baculum. The use of force is contrasted with the use
of reasoned argument, which appeals to the free judgment of the other person or
persons, who are not seen as objects. “Recourse to argumentation assumes the
establishment of a community of minds, which, while it lasts, excludes the use of
violence” (p.55). One is even exhorted to employ one’s own beliefs in persuasion
only to the extent that the interlocutor is willing to give assent to them. Clearly,
such advice tells against a pejorative sense of rhetoric where any means may be
used to persuade an audience.7
Still, the menace of that pejorative sense lurks always in the shadows of the
New Rhetoric, sometimes encroaching into discussions where it is identified and
addressed. This is particularly evident in some of the closing sections, where the
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authors are acutely conscious of objections that may be raised to their project.
Many of the strategies of argumentation and schemes they describe may be rejected
as contrivances, artificial means to the end of persuasion, hiding the arguer’s
intentions behind a variety of devices: “Argument addressed to others and eloquence
in all its forms has always been subject to disqualification and is constantly exposed
to it.… It is sufficient to qualify what has been said as “rhetorical” to rob it of its
effectiveness” (p.450). The charge of “device” arises like a charge of “fallacy,” at
least insofar as it undermines the effectiveness of the argumentation. But unlike a
fallacy, a rhetorical device is indeed the vehicle of persuasiveness and needs to be
retained. The more effective devices are those that go unnoticed, that appear natural.
And this naturalness is achieved by a variety of means, such as matching the
device to what, in the hearer’s likely estimation, is appropriate for the object of the
discourse (p.453). As useful as such means may be to allay the concern over
devices, the most fitting strategy may be to encourage audience involvement in the
argumentation itself, so that the audience shares something of what is developed.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca hint that such a move is desirable when they appeal
to Pascal: “…people are generally better persuaded by the reasons which they
have themselves discovered than by those which have come into the mind of
others” (cited in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p.453). First-hand
recognition of something is likely to be more compelling than a second-hand relating
of it, because the person “sees” the point and invests in the idea. Self-persuasion,
insofar as it is being explicitly encouraged here, indicates further the non-exploitative
sense of rhetoric that governs the proceedings.
In light of the foregoing explanation, we can perhaps appreciate why Perelman
would be so alarmed by any perceived hint of a pejorative attitude toward rhetoric
in the work of like-minded logicians. It is not so much that such an attitude is
misguided as that it discourages serious appreciation of rhetoric in logical contexts.
It was far better to adopt the kind of perspective that animates the model of
rhetorical argumentation advocated by Perelman (and Olbrechts-Tyteca). This is a
model that values the audience and presents the arguer and audience as co-operating
in a shared community of mutual regard.

3. Audience
The attention to audience in the New Rhetoric and the stress on adherence indicates
a key difference from the approaches of informal logic. Argumentation, for Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca, involves the attempt to bring about adherence in the minds
of an audience, understood as those to whom the argumentation is addressed
(1969, p.7). Thus, the thrust of what they present is aimed at the construction of
arguments, at how to put arguments together in order to win over audiences to a
point of view. Informal logic, on the other hand, largely expresses an interest in the
products of argumentation (the arguments) and the degree to which they can be
deemed strong or cogent (Johnson & Blair, 2000; Freeman, 2005; Finocchiaro,
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2005).8 At the same time, both sets of theorists put forward a complete model of
argumentation which involves both the production or invention of arguments and
criteria to assess their strength. To that end the new rhetoricians must provide
some comment on evaluation and the criteria of strength to be employed; and the
informal logicians must address the invention of arguments. The evaluation of the
new rhetoricians, if it is going to gain wide adherence itself, must involve more
than determining whether adherence has been achieved; just as the advice given by
informal logicians about the construction of arguments must involve more than
the avoidance of fallacies.
One theorist closely aligned with the informal logicians who has addressed the
issue of audience in a critical way is Trudy Govier (1999, Ch. 11). In fact, her
discussion is an implicit challenge to the work of Perelman since she judges that
the kind of audience for which much argumentation is produced (particularly in
the mass media) is a noninteractive audience the beliefs and intentions of which
cannot be known. As she reviews the situation, informal logicians have implicitly
assumed an importance for audience in a number of ways. Premise acceptability,
for example, involves the evaluation of whether the premises of an argument are
acceptable to someone (1999, p.185).9 This is fine for what she calls “direct
evaluation,” when the audience is the person being addressed directly by the
argument. Even historical arguments (she uses the case of Hume’s argument against
miracles) can be evaluated when we take the reasonable stance that such an argument
has the kind of broad relevance such that it can be treated as being directed to us.
I can decide to become the audience for an argument, should I find that it addresses
me. But if we look at arguments indirectly, then we are taking on a perspective
other than our own where we are asking whether other people should have been
persuaded by them. It is here that her concerns with the noninteractive audience
come to the fore. By a noninteractive audience she means a “noninteractive,
heterogeneous audience whose views are unknown and unpredictable” (p.188).
Anyone who constructs arguments for the mass media, for example, or aims their
arguments at nonspecialists, confronts such a noninteractive audience. Such seems
to be the antithesis of the audience as it is viewed in Perelman’s rhetoric. At the
time of construction the arguer knows little about the audience and cannot interact
with them. Not even a device like the universal audience can help us here, since the
noninteractive audience shares only its indeterminateness, not its status as a standard
of reasonableness.
After considering such points, Govier concludes that it is not useful to appeal
to audience to resolve issues such as acceptability, and so falls back on other more
standard informal logic criteria like whether premises are common knowledge, or
knowable a priori, or defended elsewhere, or on reliable testimony or authority
(p.199). In general, these are the criteria she uses for assessing acceptability in her
own informal logic textbook (1997, and subsequent editions). Thus, it is not entirely
the case that audience has been ignored in informal logic but, given the force and
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authority of Govier’s critique, there seems to have been little appetite to adopt it as
a central consideration in either evaluation or construction, particularly when the
criteria that she has identified can be preferred.
Undoubtedly, the noninteractive audience, as Govier has presented it, is a serious
challenge to those who wish to argue for the centrality of audience. I will address
that below. But what might first strike us as strange is the alternative that she
provides. It is by no means obvious that her criteria do avoid recourse to an
audience. Granted, whether something is knowable a priori might qualify if we
have no concerns about who is doing the knowing. But other criteria like ‘common
knowledge’ and ‘testimony appeals’ put us right back in the interactive arena. We
do not know, for example, what people know in common, but we can assess what
ideas and beliefs are current in certain contexts. On these terms we can assess
what people in those contexts should accept. Here, we are talking about the
environment of an audience that is being addressed, an environment that we share
if we find ourselves addressed by the argument. In judging acceptability, we judge
how well the arguer has captured that context. Likewise, whether we accept the
appeal to someone’s testimony or the word of an authority depends in many (perhaps
most) cases on contextual features surrounding that appeal. Some claims seem
strange in certain contexts, and an audience would be justified in challenging the
testimony of the claimant. Much depends on what counts as normal in that context
or community. Thus, it is by no means clear that Govier has provided the informal
logician a raft in a sea of noninteractiveness, let alone the safety of a shore. Wherever
we turn, an audience can be waiting, whether our business is construction or
evaluation.
In spite of the difference of focus, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s ways of
gaining adherence involve strategies of argumentation that do overlap some of the
material that we would find in an informal logic text. Moreover other aspects of
their account contribute useful insights to the project of informal logic generally,
especially if they promise a solution to the problem of audience that still lingers
after Govier’s treatment.
The starting point of argumentation, for Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, involves
basic premises understood as types of agreement. Thus, they will speak of facts,
which are types of agreement that involve no further strengthening (1969, p.67)
and truths, which relate to systems of wider import. These primary agreements,
or starting points, can suggest certain loci (or topoi) that may be employed to meet
an audience where it “lives” and move its members toward a position the arguer
wishes them to consider. Loci of quantity, for example, may capture generally
agreed upon ideas, such as that more education is better than less. The arguer can
assume this and not have to provide argumentation for it. Such presumptions can
be justified in terms of what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca describe as a general
inertia in a society. Inertia in argumentation (like its parallel principle in physics)
relates to the fund of established ideas and principles that do not need to be discussed
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anew each time because there is a weight of societal agreement in their favour
(pp.105-06).10 Whether prompted by habit or a desire for coherence, we assume
that what has been adopted will continue into the future unless some compelling
case for change can be justified through argument (as does occur whenever we
break with constraints of tradition which constitutes the body of agreements by
which people live). It is, then, change, and not inertia that needs justification. But
in all these instances, choices are made in relation to the intended audience. The
arguer does not work in a vacuum, but against the background of a known set of
beliefs and understandings that are shared with the audience. The arguments that
develop may emerge as products characterized by premises and claims, but they
have been crafted in situ, that is, at the point of interaction between arguer and
audience. As such, the “presence” of the audience has affected the nature of the
argument—has set constraints to it, conditioned its premises and even the scheme
that has been adopted. If there is a parallel concept to this in informal logic, that of
‘common knowledge’ comes closest. In fact, on the terms just explained we can
appreciate further how the preference for this idea in determining acceptability has
not escaped the terrain of audience since we must always ask whose knowledge is
under consideration in any judgment of ‘common knowledge’. Even the arguer
addressing her points in the mass media understands the broad range of attitudes
and knowledge that comprise the pool of inertia at any particular time. Drawing on
her own experience, Govier notes how unexpected voices in her mass audience
later speak out in ways that show her arguments have been received as she could
never have anticipated. But this does not undermine the value of the argumentation
itself; it only speaks to its dialogical nature and the ongoing discourses that it can
engender.
We see the contributions made by the audience emphasized in Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s treatment of an argument type, deemed fallacious by many,
and ubiquitous in informal logic textbooks, and that is the ad hominem. But the
treatment this is given will not be so familiar. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have
earlier made a key distinction between a particular audience and a universal audience
rooted in it that represents the power of reason in that audience.11 Ad hominem
arguments, with their bases in opinion, are directed at particular audiences because
they will have no weight for the universal audience (p.111). The premises of such
arguments “fix the framework within which the argument unfolds: it is for this
reason that we link the examination of this question with agreements particular to
certain argumentations” (p.111). This serves to emphasize how really audiencespecific the argumentation is at what we may think of as “ground level.” Each
argument is addressed to the person or persons involved, hence its ad hominem
nature. By contrast, the sense in which this label has been more widely used is
identified as the ad personam, the attempt to disqualify someone through a personal
attack. While such strategies are not given the kind of complex treatment we now
see developed in the writings of informal logic,12 their relationship to the more
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general ad hominem serves to reinforce a feature of the ‘ad’ arguments that is
being appreciated with increasing frequency—they are context dependent and so
the persuasive elements of the argument will lie not in its internal relationship
between parts but externally in relation to features of the context.
This begins to show how the rhetorical not just enters in, but grounds Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s approach to argumentation. Begging the Question is
characterized in a similar way in a treatment that addresses what has been a problem
in the logical tradition—the apparent validity of a fallacious argument. The New
Rhetoric does not treat Begging the Question in a formal sense, that is, as a technique
of demonstration; but as a problem of adherence. Thus, “it is not an error of logic,
but of rhetoric” (p.112). It assumes that an interlocutor has already given adherence
to the proposition which the arguer is trying to get that person to accept. Only
within the framework of an argumentation that is rooted in a concern with audience
(and not in a demonstration) can such instances of Begging the Question be
appraised, because only in such contexts do we weigh what propositions an audience
already accepts and which ones they might reasonably be brought to accept. It is
fruitless to assess the relationship of propositions in isolation from the minds that
are proposed to hold them.
Generally, other “labels” that should interest the informal logician arise in the
New Rhetoric in relation to similar concerns. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
approach the construction of argumentation in terms of techniques, some of which,
like the Argument of Waste (p.279),13 are based on the structure of reality and
others of which, like the Argument from Analogy (p.372),14 establish the structure
of reality. In each case, the technique is to be employed in relation to the intended
audience and appropriate strategies for gaining the adherence of that audience in a
reasonable way. In a similar way, they had previously presented the techniques
that they term quasi-logical arguments. These arguments acquire their persuasiveness
from their resemblance to formal patterns of argument. So ‘incompatibility’
resembles ‘contradiction’ (pp.195-97) and ridicule borrows its persuasiveness from
the reductio (p.205). But in each case the appeal is to the underlying circumstances
rather than to a formal system. Propositions become incompatible, for example,
“as the result of a certain determination of notions with respect to particular
circumstances” (p.201); and the ridiculous arises in contrast to opinions that are
accepted (p.206). While we cannot suggest a parallel between quasi-logical
arguments and informal argument patterns, since the latter do not derive their
force from any close relation with formal logic, they do share a common agenda
of dealing with reasoning outside of formal systems, of being in their respective
ways logics of argumentation (where this is set in contrast with demonstration).
Among the large variety of techniques advanced by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca,
whether quasi-logical, based on reality, or establishing the structure of reality, the
choices governing the construction of the content and the techniques to be employed
arise always in relation to the audience whose adherence is at issue.15
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4. Evaluation
Where there is more room for overlap between Perelman’s approach and informal
logic is in the common interest in evaluation. While the majority of the New Rhetoric
seems aimed at construction, the model cannot be presented as a complete model
of argumentation without some sense of how argumentation will be evaluated. Of
course, the pat response to this is to echo Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s own
remarks throughout the opening sections of the book: Argumentation aims at the
adherence of an audience and so the obvious measure of that success is seeing
that such adherence ensues. Thus we see critical reactions to the model restricting
its notion of soundness to this condition. A common reaction is the following:
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca offer a rhetorical concept of rationality in
which soundness of argumentation is equated with the degree to which
argumentation is well suited to those for whom it is intended. This means
that the soundness of argument is, according to this criterion, always related
to an audience. (van Eemeren, et. al., 1996)

This assumption that the New Rhetoric reduces soundness to effectiveness is
partly encouraged by the way Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca present their ideas.
The way they reconsider, for example, the distinction between persuading and
convincing, that has traditionally divided rhetoricians and philosophers, can create
confusion. They talk at length about the way those concerned with action value
persuasion, while those concerned with the rational character of adherence value
convincing (1969, p.27). But as they also explain, this distinction itself is
misconceived. While a syllogism may induce conviction but not persuasion, that is
only because it is being considered in isolation from its context, as a product. It is
for this reason that they explicitly refuse to adopt a sharp division between the
two. They are interested in “the difference between conviction and persuasion as
it is experienced by the hearer,” (p.29) and judge that this will always be imprecise.
The hearer, while persuaded, “imagines transferred to other audiences” (p.29) the
argument presented, and so considers it both at the level of the personal and at the
level of the general. Hence, conviction reinforces persuasion and cannot be clearly
distinguished from it. This begins to suggest ways around the charge that
effectiveness is all that is at issue, but it does not tell the whole story, nor does it
disperse the spectre of relativism that is often associated with it (van Eemeren and
Grootendorst, 1995—an extreme relativism, really, that sees the criteria of
reasonableness not relative to communities but to individual arguers.16
We cannot ignore the emphasis on adherence in the early parts of the New
Rhetoric that give fuel to this reading. But nor should we ignore what might be
viewed as the climax of the book with its turn to a discussion of when arguments
are strong, and when weak. In terms of the general tone of the critique, we might
expect the answer there to be something along the lines of: when we see an audience
act in a way that indicates adherence to the claim, then the argument is strong
because successful; and when we see no adherence take root, the argument is
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weak. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do say some things that gesture in this
direction. The strength of arguments will be connected to a hearer’s adherence to
the premises (p.461). But this is adherence at the starting point of an argument,
not its terminus in action. The strength of an argument lies partly in the difficulty
that there is in refuting it. Thus, while the strength of arguments will vary with the
audience, this is in relation to the types of arguments that are chosen for different
audiences. They note, for example, that Aristotle recommended argument by example
for deliberative oratory and Whately advised arguments from cause to effect when
addressing certain minds. The intent here is to focus on the arguments used and
criteria of strength associated with them and in particular their refutation. They
then raise what must be the crucial question for informal logicians reading the New
Rhetoric: “Is a strong argument an effective argument which gains the adherence
of the audience, or is it a valid argument, which ought to gain it?” (p.463). Like
many distinctions Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca evoke, this one cannot be absolute.
What would count as the normal (descriptive) and the norm (prescriptive) can
only be defined through “an audience whose reactions provide the measure of
normality and whose adherence is the foundation of standards of value” (p.463).
This is to ask whence our standards of reasonableness arise, in relation to which
audience? To address these kinds of questions and respond to their own regarding
strength, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca invoke an earlier discussion of the rule
of justice.
Success is one thing, and certainly the rhetorical arguer pursues this. But she
also wants success on rational grounds, and to that extent her argument must
meet a more exacting condition that will allow it to be tested. The rule of justice is
first introduced back in the section on quasi-logical arguments. There, the rule of
justice requires “giving identical treatment to beings or situations of the same kind.
The reasonableness of this rule and the power that it is recognized as having derive
from the principle of inertia, from which originates in particular the importance
that is given to precedent” (pp.218-19). As we saw above, established ideas and
principles do not need to be discussed anew each time because there is an inertial
force of societal agreement in their favour. For Perelman in particular this idea
underlies the legal validity of precedence in law. In these terms, the rule of justice
allows us to pass from earlier cases to future cases (p.219).
At the close of the book (what Crosswhite calls its “center of gravity” [2000,
p.7]), this rule is brought in to address the discussion of validity. After all, what
provides the criterion of validity?17 Usually, it is some theory of knowledge involving
techniques that have been effective in various fields of learning and that can be
transferred to others. This has given rise to the clash between the methodologies
of different fields and the quest for the unity of science grounded in the criterion
of self-evidence. But when the self-evident is the criterion of validity it discredits
all argumentation which may be effective but does not provide “real” proof. This
aside (since Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s entire project has resisted this kind
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of thinking), there can be no doubt that a distinction is made between weak and
strong arguments, and so they write:
Our hypothesis is that this strength is appraised by application of the rule of
justice: that which was capable of convincing in a specific situation will
appear to be convincing in a similar or analogous situation. The comparison
of situations will be the subject of constant study and refinement in each
particular discipline. (p.464)

We might reasonably ask how this will work, how would the norms of
reasonableness that guarantee validity be recognized through the rule of justice? A
fitting answer to this is suggested through their treatment of the Red Herring,
which they understand in terms familiar to informal logicians as a problem of
shifting a discussion to another subject that is considered irrelevant (p.484). If
there was agreement as to the irrelevance of diversions, this device would
characterize weak arguments:
But there seldom is. The charge of diversion and the charge of fallacy are
alike in that they both assume that the introduction of the irrelevant or
fallacious argument was deliberate. Now the charge can be sustained only in
cases where there is a substantial departure from what is usual. It is indeed
theoretically possible to deny that such parts of a discourse as the exordium
and peroration have any argumentative value, and to treat them as diversions.
It is the application of the rule of justice that enables one to arrive at an
opinion in this matter. (p.485)

The answer suggested here is that we look to similar, established cases to determine
what should count as relevant in this case. If there is a precedent set or a
presumption in favour of treating the exordium and peroration as parts of the
argument, then they are not diversions. The conditions of the Red Herring brought
to bear on the case and framing the matter raise exactly this kind of question and
serve as an example of reasonable criteria that transcend particular cases and
determine validity by means of what is generally accepted.
More particularly, there are implications here for the authority of the Red Herring
itself as such a set of conditions.18 The Red Herring is a pattern or regularized
typology of argument. But where do its conditions come from? To say that we can
detect them already in Aristotle’s remarks on diversions (Topics, 111b31-112a11)
is not an answer. From where does Aristotle get his understanding for dealing with
it? After all, some fallacies have fallen by the wayside over the course of the
tradition, and for others we allow both reasonable and unreasonable versions of
the arguments.
The rule of justice points to the pattern itself as having been drawn from cases
that define it. It is part of a community’s grounded understanding of what count as
conditions of reasonableness. This commonality challenges the extreme relativism
identified above. Arguers belong to communities of reasoners, communities that
they have in common with their audiences. In this sense, they share the common
patterns of what is reasonable. Simply put, the rule of justice provides a constraint
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on mere acceptance. Audiences are not free to accept whatever they would like.
They operate in a field of reasoning that provides established judgments and the
patterns on which they have been judged reasonable. Whatever we accept has to
fit with what has been accepted in other, similar instances. This is what gives
coherence to our judgments and a sense of our belonging to a community of
reasoners. We can challenge the standards we inherit, argue that they do not transfer
to our case, argue that they are misapplied, but we cannot ignore them. Arguers
appreciate this; such standards are part of the cognitive environment of the audiences
they interact with, at a level at which we all interact.
Another of the later sections of the New Rhetoric explores the concept of
dissociation (one, along with association, that had been introduced earlier). The
strategy of dissociation involves taking an established concept and dividing it along
particular lines, with one of the separated elements promoted as having a value
over its more traditional counterpart.19 An incompatibility in the way a concept
appears gives rise to the break among the original unity of elements within the
single concept. A contemporary example is suggested in the way ‘cloning’ is
separated into therapeutic and reproductive varieties, with value attached to the
first. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca suggest that this strategy is characteristic of
how new concepts emerge in the history of philosophy, and they provide a wealth
of examples to illustrate their proposal (1969, pp.415-38). Once this strategy has
been introduced and has been understood, the reader is able to look back at the
terrain of the New Rhetoric and the wider expanse of Perelman’s work generally
and appreciate it as a series of dissociations, most clearly of ‘reason’ itself.
Elsewhere (1963, p.158), Perelman contrasts historic reason (with the rule of
justice as its constituent principle) with an eternal reason (principles of identity and
non-contradiction). I think we can assign these places within the respective columns
of argumentation and demonstration. What makes one reason “historic” rather
than eternal is that it exhibits what we might call an “historicity.” It allows us to
conceive of reason not as ahistorical and fixed, but something that arises in history
and moves and changes through history, like the pattern ‘Red Herring’. Crosswhite
captures something of what is at stake here when he writes: “The measure of
reasoning is not some timeless logical standard located in the essential nature of
constantly present things” (1996, p.36). The measure of reasoning is always an
audience in history, drawing off of audiences in contiguous times and locations,
but able to change and modify its standards as experience and the argumentation
presented to it warrants. “The historicity of reason,” writes Perelman, “is always
closely connected with it becoming part of a tradition” (1963, p.157). The power
of inertia is a strong force stabilizing our reasoning and resisting the spectre of
extreme relativism. But reason remains historical, albeit an almost-tradition, open
to the justifications for changing standards. A graphic illustration of this, I would
suggest, are the emerging standards of informal logic, like those for argument
evaluation and the criteria for identifying and assessing fallacies.
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The fitting comparator to reason’s historicity is that of science. Since at least
Kuhn (1962) we have been apprised of the ways in which science, like reason, is
historical, reflected in the collective achievement of the group. Kuhn recognizes
the group (admittedly, the “uniquely competent professional group”) as the exclusive
arbiter of achievement (1962, p.168). But, importantly, the standard lies solely
within this community, never outside it. The inertia exhibited by normal science
and the shifts of change in extraordinary science both exhibit progress.20 The
parallel is compelling.
When we construct arguments aimed at a generalized audience, and when we
evaluate the same, it seems implausible that we confront the vague and unresponsive
anonymity that Govier imagines as her noninteractive audience. There is always
something there at which we direct our ideas, even if it is only at first an expanded
mirror of ourselves. In the ongoing interaction, that audience takes shape and the
dialogue becomes more meaningful. But when we assess the reasonableness of
that audience’s actual and expected responses, we assess them according to
standards that are alive in that audience and shared between arguer and audience.
We may fall back on ‘audience-independent’ criteria like common knowledge,
testimony, etc. But those measures of what is reasonable only work because they
are shared by the audiences concerned. Because, Perelman is suggesting, those
criteria do not drop fully made into the logician’s tool box. They work because
they are shared and have been passed through history from audience to audience.

5. Conclusion
“Every systematic treatment of argumentation has two branches, one
concerned with invention of arguments and the other with judgement of their
validity.” (Cicero, Topics II6)

On balance, there is much to look for in any blending of the two approaches. After
all, I have yet to ask what Perelman meant by informal logic in the remark taken
from his late work. Given the general distinction he and Olbrechts-Tyteca drew
between demonstration with its self-evident truths compelling assent from all rational
minds and eschewing the need for argumentation, and argumentation itself, that
sphere which eludes certainty and concerns the credible, plausible and probable, it
seems uncontroversial that Perelman would take informal logic to be the logic of
such argumentation. And while Perelman’s project, as set out in the New Rhetoric,
does not share all the goals of informal logic, as theories of argument, they cannot
help but have interests in common matters and ideals. This comes to the fore in the
question of evaluation, on which a fruitful exchange between the two approaches
to argumentation might ensue. In particular, the clarity of schemes and more detailed
criteria of evaluation that have emerged in informal logic would help tighten the
looser ideas of the New Rhetoric; while the latter’s greater sensitivity to the
importance of audience promises to enrich the work of informal logic.21
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Notes
1

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca offer the same explanation for choosing to call their approach
rhetorical rather than dialectical (1969, p.5; p.54).
2
He had been invited to join the editorial board of Informal Logic, but declined because of what
he took to be its purely pedagogical focus, perhaps basing his judgment on the earlier Informal
Logic Newsletter.
3
While in the Proceedings of the First International Symposium on Informal Logic, Johnson and
Blair identify The New Rhetoric as one of only three monographs of significance to informal logic,
still the program set out there distinguishes informal logic and rhetoric as separate disciplines
whose relationship is unclear (1980, p.26).
4
See, for example, the article by Groarke (2007) in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http:/
/plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-informal/#Rhe.
5
This is the phrase I will use to refer to the perspective or account we associate with Perelman.
When explicit reference is made to the central work he co-authored with Olbrechts-Tyteca, then
the title will be italicized.
6
Nor does all argumentation aimed at adherence involve persuasion. Some techniques, like
illustration (1969, p.357), are designed to strengthen an adherence that is already present.
7
Nor should the construction of a universal audience (for each particular one) be seen to counter
this concern for real interlocutors. In a discussion that includes consideration of Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s universal audience, Ricoeur (2000, p.118) observes that the universality at
stake would not seem to be the inner monologue often associated with Kant’s universal, but the
dialogical connection to an audience grounded in others.
8
To take observations from this admittedly selective group: Johnson & Blair (2000) suggest that
leading practitioners of informal logic, like Trudy Govier, Douglas Walton, and themselves see its
mandate as “the study of norms of argument” and construe a definition of informal logic that fits
the practices of all those they have identified: “Informal logic designates that branch of logic
whose task is to develop non-formal standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation,
evaluation, critique and construction of argumentation in everyday discourse” (2000, p.94).
Freeman identifies the interests of informal logic with the “issues of argument evaluation,”
specifically whether the premises are justified and the conclusion is then justified by the premises
(2005, p.x). Finally, Finocchiaro provides the most comprehensive definition by presenting
informal logic as the theory of reasoning (2005, p.22) and later the theory of argument (p.93). By
this in turn he means “the attempt to formulate, to test, to clarify, and to systematize concepts
and principles for the interpretation, the evaluation, and the sound practice of reasoning” (p.22).
While construction is not absent from the sights of informal logicians, the concern has been first
and foremost to develop standards of evaluation. But as exceptions to this we should note Vorobej
(2006, pp.4-5), Pinto (2001, p.119) and Govier (1999, p.185).
9
Moreover, the judgment that premises are relevant to the conclusion they support assumes that
connection can be recognized, and whether a premise-set meets a sufficiency requirement may
depend on the context in which it is being assessed.
10
An excellent discussion of inertia in the New Rhetoric is provided by James Crosswhite (2000).
11
I have tackled the notion of the universal audience and tried to develop Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca’s account in several places: see Tindale, 1999, chapters 3&4; 2004, chapter 6, and
forthcoming.
12
See Walton (1988).
13
Consider the strategy of argument popularized by George W. Bush:
‘We have invested enormous resources of money and lives in the reconstruction of Iraq. To
withdraw now would be a tremendous waste of those commitments. Thus we should stay the
course and finish the job.’
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14

Their analysis involves a relationship of structures (A is to B as C is to D) belonging to different
spheres, along the lines of what Aristotle provides in De Anima: The soul is to the body [A to B]
as sight is to the eye [C to D]. No one expects sight to survive the death of the eye. And so (A is
to B as C is to D)—no one expects the soul to survive the death of the body.
15
As a rhetorical model of argumentation, Perelman’s promotes the Aristotelian triad of logos,
ethos and pathos. In the limited space available here, and with respect to its particular relevance,
I have focused on the logos. But the New Rhetoric also gives ample attention to questions of
ethos, particularly as this concerns the prestige of the arguer and question of the act-person
relationship (1969, p.303). It is a more contentious issue as to whether the expected attention to
pathos is present. Gross and Dearin (2003) criticize this as a serious omission. But we might see
some questions of pathos raised indirectly in, for example, the technique of appealing to symbols.
The image of a malnourished HIV sufferer in Africa is a pathotic appeal because of what that
image represents as a symbol.
16
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst charge that soundness will vary from case to case depending on
the criteria employed by the audience: “This means that the standard of reasonableness is extremely
relative” (1995, p.124). On this reading, there can be as many definitions of reasonableness as
audiences and, if attention is shifted to the universal audience constructed by arguers, as many
definitions of reasonableness as there are arguers.
17
Nothing they say here suggests they mean the validity associated with formal demonstrations.
What they have in mind seems closer the kind of inductive validity advocated by C.L. Hamblin
(1970, p.225; p.245ff.).
18
And here, of course, informal logicians provide a welcome advance on such thinking with several
considered treatments of criteria for this and other argument types.
19
The concept of dissociation has been extensively explored and developed in the work of van
Rees (2002; 2005).
20
As Kuhn also points out (pp.171-72), marking the absence of “truth” from his account, the fact
that we progress from a primitive point does not mean we move toward a goal. Likewise, no
teleological account of reason is assumed here. I am grateful to James Crosswhite for drawing the
relevance of Kuhn’s history to my attention.
21
An earlier version of this paper was discussed by the members of the Centre for Research in
Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric (CRRAR) at the University of Windsor. I am grateful to
all those involved for their discussion and particularly to Ralph Johnson and David Godden for
their detailed comments. I am also grateful for the comments of James Crosswhite and a further,
anonymous, referee.
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